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Abstract
For some considerable time now the interface between ambulatory and hospital care has been mooted as a cause of
inefficiencies in the German health system and there have been calls for a softening of the strict separation between
the two sectors. This debate emphasizes the need for detailed empirical information on the interdependence
between the two sectors. Using extensive administrative data at the level of the 412 German counties for the years
2007 to 2009 and a simultaneous equation model which allows the numbers of ambulatory and hospital cases to be
mutually interdependent, we examine the connection between ambulatory and hospital specialist care separately for
ten medical specialties. The results show that the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital services is far from
homogeneous. The relationship depends, on the one hand, on the specialty and, on the other, on the direction of the
effect observed. This heterogeneity needs to be taken into account for cross-sector needs-based planning.
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Background
Despite the aging society and the connected increase in
demand for health services which in principle accompa-
nies it, the German hospital market is still conspicuous for
its overcapacities [1]. An international comparison shows
that only Austria has a higher hospital bed density than
Germany. While in Sweden 2.1 beds in acute hospitals for
every 1000 inhabitants must suffice, in Germany there are
5.7 [2]. One reason for the overcapacities originates from
progress in medical technology. Services which previously
had to be performed in hospitals can now increasingly
be carried out on an ambulatory basis. This is particu-
larly true of Germany where, in contrast to most other
countries, a recognised and accepted feature of the health-
care system means that specialist medical services can be
performed both on an ambulatory basis by office-based
doctors and on an inpatient basis by specialist physicians
working in hospitals.
For some considerable time now problems associated
with this dual provision of medical care have been the
subject of extensive debate in Germany, with the contro-
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versy focussing on the interface between the ambulatory
and the hospital sectors. The loudest calls are for care
to be reorganised to avoid this strict separation which
manifests itself in the German health service not only in
two completely different remuneration systems for ambu-
latory and inpatient services but also in two different
planning regimes. While hospital planning is the prerog-
ative of the 16 German states, there exists a separate
system of needs-based planning for ambulatory medi-
cal practices with rules set at the federal level. In their
present form these two planning systems are mutually
incompatible. To quote but one example: planning in the
hospital sector is by beds while in the ambulatory sec-
tor the planning unit is the individual doctor. During the
drafting of the Statutory Health Insurance Structure of
Services Act (2012) the idea of overcoming this incom-
patibility with cross-sectoral needs-based planning was
suggested. Although in the end no such system was intro-
duced, the recently added paragraph §90a in the Ger-
man Sozialgesetzbuch, allows for a joint committee to
be formed to submit recommendations on cross-sector
healthcare issues.
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For the implementation and the functioning of a
cross-sector needs-based planning it is essential to have
information about the linkage between the provision of
services in the two sectors, ambulatory and hospital. Only
with this knowledge can a functioning cross-sector plan-
ning system be devised. The linkage between the provi-
sion of services in the ambulatory and hospital sectors of
the health service is therefore the subject of this article.
To date there have been only few international studies
which examine the connection between the ambulatory
and hospital sectors. For most countries this is because
theirmedical services are structured differently. For exam-
ple, in some countries with what is known as the GP or
Gatekeeper Model access to medical services is restricted
by law. In this model the GP has the task of piloting the
patient through the health service, authorising treatment
by an office-based specialist or in hospital. This implies a
purely complementary relationship between the two sec-
tors. In the literature, this healthcare structure has been
critically analysed both in respect of countries which are
subject to these restrictions (cf. for example [3, 4]) and
with a view to the introduction of this model in Germany
(cf. for example [5, 6]).
In addition, there are some studies which analyse the
relationships between GPs and the different specialists
in both the public and the private sectors. An analysis
of Italian data by Atella and Deb [7], for instance, finds
a significant substitutive relationship between utilization
in the two sectors. The relationships are estimated with
the help of a simultaneous equation system. This is based
on the assumption that GP consultations have an influ-
ence on the numbers of the specialists’ cases, but not the
other way around. It is also assumed that the case num-
bers of the specialists in the public system have an effect
on those of their colleagues in the private system but not
vice versa.
A study by Adhikari [8] which concentrates on the rela-
tionship between ambulatory and hospital medical ser-
vices to treat visceral leishmaniasis in Australia, provides
evidence of a substitutive relationship between the two
sectors. In the study, the elasticity of demand is first cal-
culated separately for each sector. Subsequently, the rela-
tionship between the sectors is analyzed on basis of cross
price elasticity. Another study by Fortney et al. [9] presents
results from a natural experiment at the U.S. Department
for Veterans Affairs, in which primary care services were
increased in some districts but not in others. They look
at the relationship between the utilization of GP services
and those of ambulatory and hospital specialists. Taking
into account the interdependence of the utilization of GP
and all other medical services the study identifies a substi-
tutive relationship between GP and office-based specialist
care. However, the relationship between ambulatory and
inpatient specialist services is neglected.
Kopetsch [10] examines the relationship between the
ambulatory and hospital services provided in Germany in
the year 2000, using data at the county level for the states
of Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony. Since the
relationship varies by medical speciality, the analysis is
carried out separately for ten groups of specialists. For
this, he estimates an equation in which the ambulatory
case numbers per inhabitant and further control variables
explain the number of the hospital cases per inhabi-
tant. Potential endogeneity problems in the study are not
dealt with. The empirical analysis finds a complementary
relationship for the specialities dermatology, ENT, paedi-
atrics and orthopaedics while no significant relationship
between ambulatory and hospital cases is detected for the
other specialities.
Another strand of the literature discusses whether the
parallel provision of services by the two sectors can be
considered an important cause of inefficiencies and waste
of resources (cf. for example [11–14]). On the one hand,
a structure which duplicates specialists can lead to verti-
cal competition between the office-based specialists and
the hospitals. In the absence of incentives this competition
can be counterproductive since the services are not deliv-
ered where they can be performed most cost-effectively.
On the other hand, unnecessary costs may be incurred for
repeated examinations if ambulatory specialist treatment
leads to hospitalization. Looking at the service event in the
ambulatory and hospital sectors, most German and inter-
national studies concentrate on potential inefficiencies at
the interface between the two sectors. Himmel et al. [15],
for example, examined the problem of the flow of infor-
mation between hospitals and GPs and the consequent
discontinuity of care. In order to test this, the authors
concentrated on the medication administered on admis-
sion to hospital and provided considerable evidence of
changes in the prescriptions during the stay in hospital.
Hach et al. [16] show that hospitalization neither saves the
ambulatory follow-up treatment nor is accompanied by a
reduction in medication.
There are also some studies, which concentrate on the
re-hospitalization rates as an important indicator of inef-
ficiency between the two sectors. Therefore, the impact
of transitional care interventions compared to standard
hospital discharges are analyzed. As an example Wein-
berger et al. [17] studied the effect of such an intervention,
which was designed to increase access to primary care
after hospitalization. However, they found that the vet-
erans in the intervention group had significantly higher
rates of re-hospitalization and if readmitted also longer
stays in hospital than veterans in the control group. On
the other hand a study by Coleman et al. [18] found signif-
icant reductions in re-hospitalization rates and also lower
mean hospital costs for for the patients in the interven-
tion group. Despite of contrary findings regarding to care
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transition and rehospitalization, it confirms once more
that it is worth to analyze the interface of the two sectors.
It is important to note that the studies cited above focus
on very specific aspects of the interdependence of ambula-
tory and hospital care for which the nature of the interplay
between the two sectors might be quite different. In other
words, one may well find a complementary relationship
for one specific situation and a substitutive relationship
for the other.
The present analysis takes broader perspective, unlike
the majority of the existing studies, we use administrative
data that comprehensively covers the provision of inpa-
tient and ambulatory care in Germany. The present paper
expands the empirical evidence on the interdependence
between the two sectors in Germany, focussing on how
the provision of services in one sector relates to utiliza-
tion in the other. It should be noted, however, that the
present paper is only an exploratory study and cannot
say anything about possible channels for positive or nega-
tive relationships between utilization in different sectors.
Nor can the paper make a statement on efficiency in the
system, as both individual level data and data on health
outcomes are missing. Yet the results could serve as a
starting point to dig deeper into potential reasons for the
found relationships.
The results show a significant negative relationship for
paediatrics and dermatology, with more specialist ambu-
latory cases leading to fewer hospital admissions. Consid-
ering the reversed direction, however, i.e. the impact of
additional hospitalizations on the number of ambulatory
cases, a significant positive connection can be observed
for orthopaedics, gynaecology and otorhinolaryngology
(ENT), with more hospital cases leading to additional
ambulatory cases and a significant negative relationship
for internal medicine. Furthermore we report a significant
positive effect of GP cases on surgery and orthopaedic
cases in hospital and also a significant positive relation-
ship between ENT and GP cases for the reversed direc-
tion. Considering an increase in the number of all specialist
cases the results show a significant decrease of GP cases
and except for internal medicine and surgery, the same
connection can be observed for the opposite direction.
The results of this study highlight the importance of
a disaggregation of the data for the individual medical
specialities, as they reveal a clear heterogeneity in the
interdependences between the sectors. The relationship
depends, on the one hand, on the medical speciality and,
on the other, on the direction of the influence observed.
Any possible cross-sector needs-based planning should
take these linkages into account.
Data and descriptive analysis
In the course of the analysis data from different sources
are linked. The first of the two most important data
sources is the accounting data of the KBV (National Asso-
ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians), which
contains in detail the ambulatory case numbers per med-
ical speciality. This administrative data covers all info-
mation of utilization of medical services by members of
the German statutory health insurance system, i.e. 90% of
the population.1 The case numbers are aggregated at the
level of the 413 counties (412 after two counties merged
in 2009). Since this information is used to calculate the
quarterly remuneration of the statutory health insurance
doctors, these data can be assumed to be highly accurate
as they are thoroughly checked for both administrative
and computational errors. The cases per county refer to
the patients’ place of residence rather than place of treat-
ment. There are the separate case numbers for GPs and
various specialities.
The second important source, the DRG statistics, pro-
vide details of the hospital cases, which are also based
on the patients’ place of residence. This source is also a
full survey of all cases in Germany. To provide an ini-
tial overview, we first examine purely descriptively the
relationship between the utilization of ambulatory and
hospital services in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. A key
aspect of the analysis is that the various medical special-
ties differ in their care structures and technical facilities,
and thus also in the extent to which medical progress
has made it possible to shift services into the ambula-
tory sector. The pattern of interdependences between the
sectors may therefore be specific to each speciality and
is, in consequence, analysed separately for each of ten
specialist fields. Both data sources allow separate empir-
ical analyses for ten specialities: ophthalmology, surgery,
internal medicine, gynaecology, dermatology, ENT, pae-
diatrics, neurology, orthopaedics and urology. Due to the
special role which they can play in the utilization of spe-
cialist services, GPs are also included in the study. Table 1
gives an overview of the mean average values of the case
numbers per county for the years 2007 to 2009 combined.
Detailed descriptive statistics on the utilization of ser-
vices can be found in the Appendix. They show that there
is variation in the utilization of services not only between
the regions but also from year to year. However, there is no
systematic pattern of the relationship between ambulatory
and hospital cases per speciality over time.
The heterogeneity between the counties can be clearly
recognised. The average number of hospitalizations is up
to seven times higher in some regions. In the ambula-
tory sector the average case numbers are in some regions
up to eleven times higher than in regions with the lowest
number of specialist cases. To illustrate the considerable
regional variation Fig. 1 takes orthopaedics and ENT as
examples of ambulatory and hospital cases. The gradi-
ent of the regression lines shows the respective direction
of the correlation over all counties. Here the differences
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics: utilization of services
Hospitalizations Ambulatory cases
per 100.000 SHI insurees per 1.000 SHI insurees
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
GPs 2,708 1,391 3,669
Ophthalmology 413 155 1,042 409 214 793
Internal Medicine 8,919 5,596 14,847 383 180 866
Paediatrics 1,475 1,076 2,679 373 121 684
Surgery 5,943 4,292 10,538 191 66 428
Urology 926 604 1,581 153 69 378
Orthopaedics 979 575 1,753 315 144 755
Gynaecology 2,930 2,177 5,449 635 315 1,606
ENT 822 466 1,234 237 101 424
Neurology 1,051 590 2,102 181 61 545
Dermatology 266 164 488 273 69 784
Observations 1.238 1.238
between the various medical specialities become appar-
ent. While there is a positive correlation between hos-
pital and ambulatory utilization in ENT the correlation
in orthopaedics is negative. To provide a comprehensive
summary of all medical specialities, the correlations of the
case numbers in the two sectors are presented in Table 2.
Overall it becomes clear that the direction of the
relationship crucially depends on the speciality. While
for ophthalmology, internal medicine, surgery, urol-
ogy, gynaecology, ENT and neurology there is a
positive correlation, the correlation is negative in pae-
diatrics, orthopaedics and dermatology. With the excep-
tion of neurology and dermatology, all correlations are
significant.
However, the predominantly positive correlations still
do not allow for drawing conclusions regarding a com-
plementary relationship between ambulatory and hospital
services. With a bivariate approach a positive correlation
is to be expected everywhere since the average state of
health of the respective population of the counties should
be reflected in both measures. Counties with health-
ier inhabitants should in principle make fewer claims
upon both ambulatory and hospital services. Equally, the
demand for both types of medical service should be higher
in counties with less healthy inhabitants.
Further control variables
An important measure for determining the level of
regional utilization is the need for medical services in a
given region. It is therefore essential to control for vari-
ations in population structure and the state of health in
each county. To capture the average state of health in
a county we use both average life expectancy and the
’RSA risk factor’ devised by the Federal (Social) Insurance
Office (Bundesversicherungsamt - BVA). The RSA risk fac-
tor is a measure of the average morbidity in a county. Used
to calculate the compensatory transfers to those statu-
tory health insurance funds whose membership evinces a
higher risk structure, it summarizes as an index the mor-
bidity of each county measured in terms of 80 important
illnesses. This is a particularly attractive variable because
it is objective, measuring the state of health as determined
by doctors. At the same time, it is comprehensive and -
like the dependent variables - probably highly accurate, as
the information it provides determines the actual flow of
money from the Risk Structure Compensation Scheme to
the SHI funds.
In addition to health status, two other factors are rele-
vant to our analysis. These are health behaviour and the
Fig. 1 Scatter diagram of the descriptive relationship between ambulatory and hospital services per county. Note: The gray line represents the
regression line
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efficiency of the individual’s own health production, as
proposed by [19]. It is well-known, for instance, that levels
of education and income correlate positively with healthy
behaviour. To capture these factors, we use correspond-
ing variables from the INKAR database maintained by the
Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR)
for 2007 and 2009.2 As there are no data available for
2008, we take the simplifying assumption that these struc-
tural variables remain constant over the short time span
of two years. Specifically we take the average net monthly
household income, the unemployment rate, the number
of regional centres, the proportion of highly qualified and
low-skilled workers, the shares of single-person house-
holds and immigrants, and the number of long-term care
recipients per 10,000 inhabitants.
To measure the influence of environmental conditions,
we take the annual average level of particulate matter pol-
lution (PM10) 3 recorded at over 400 measuring stations
distributed across Germany and published by the Federal
Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt). An algorithm
has been used to translate the data to the county level.
An overview of all control variables and their descriptive
statistics can be found in Table 3.
Methods
Any empirical analysis that is concerned with the inter-
dependence of outpatient and inpatient care faces two
methodological challenges. On the one hand, genuine
interaction between the provision of services in the two
sectors must be separated from correlation due to unob-
served heterogenity, which might be an issue in the
present data. In their analyses of the same data both
Augurzky et al. [20] and Kopetsch and Schmitz [21]
demonstrated that a large proportion of the regional
variation in hospitalizations and physician consultations
Table 3 Descriptive statistics: control variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Health status
Male life expectancy 77,077 1,460 72,200 81,100
Female life expectancy 82,103 1,020 77,900 84,900
RSA Risk Factor 1,009 0,071 0,847 1,204
Structural variables
Proportion of population
with SHI in %) 87,694 5,079 65,522 97,895
Long-term care recipients
(per 10.000 population) 278,140 60,120 145,000 512,000
Unemployment rate in % 9,203 4,464 2,300 24,200
Net monthly household income 1.500,098 201,088 1.090,000 2.585,000
Number of large regional centres 0,401 0,564 0,000 4,000
Number of medium regional centres 2,219 2,149 0,000 11,000
Highly qualified workers in % 4,168 3,294 0,600 29,700
Low-skilled workers in % 14,400 4,825 6,400 39,500
Single-person households in % 36,290 4,379 20,400 55,800
Immigrants in % 7,152 4,536 0,700 25,200
Pollutants
Particulate matter (PM 10) 19,737 6,112 0,000 31,000
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could be explained by observable differences in demo-
graphic structures and state of health. Nevertheless, a
considerable part of the variation at county level remained
unexplained and may have been caused by specific unob-
served health or preference differences between the coun-
ties which could not be controlled for.
On the other hand, the interaction between two endoge-
nous measures has to be considered. Utilization in the two
sectors thus represents both an explanatory variable and a
variable, which has to be explained. The analysis therefore
requires the estimation of a simultaneous equation model
whose parameters can only be identified with the help of
instrument variables.
Finally, in any given region the supply of general practi-
tioners (GPs) could play a role in the relationship between
ambulatory and hospital cases, too. GPs typically refer
their patients to office-based specialists, but will on occa-
sion arrange for them to be admitted directly to hospitals.
GP behaviour which differed regionally in this regard or
regional variation in GP densities would thus impact on
the linkage under examination.
In principle, there are two simple but contrast-
ing hypotheses concerning the interplay of office- and
hospital-based specialist care.
First hypothesis (substitutes) It seems natural to regard
ambulatory and hospital services as mutually substitu-
tive. If medical services which can be rendered on either
an ambulatory or an inpatient basis are performed by an
office-based doctor, no hospitalization is required. The
higher the physician density of the specialty or the higher
the ambulatory cases, the lower the hospital cases in
the region. Conversely, after a hospital stay the need for
medical services should have been met without the need
for corresponding ambulatory treatment. We hypothe-
size that this relationship exists for opthalmology, internal
medicine, surgery, orthopaedics, neurology and derma-
tology. Our intuition is that this is due to the fact that
several of the provided medical services in this diciplines
can be performed on both ambulatory and hospital basis.
An example for amedical service which is characteristic as
a service that can be performed on ambulatory or hospital
basis is cataract surgery.
Second hypothesis (complements) It can also be argued
that a complementary relationship exists. If, in a given
region, ambulatory specialist treatment frequently leads
to a hospital referral, and hospital stays necessitate ambu-
latory after-care, the result will be a positive correlation
between office- and hospital-based specialist treatment.
We expect a complementary relationship for paediatrics,
urology, gynaecology and ENT. These medical specialities
distinguish themselves from the other disciplines due to
fact that several medical services can only be performed
at a hospital while others can be carried out either at a
hospital or on an ambulatory basis. Services which are
characteristic for requiring a hospital stay are for example
abdominal hysterectomy, thyroid surgery or an cochlear
implant in case of deafness. This services are usually diag-
nosed by office-based doctors and require an admisssion
to hospital, because of limitations in the ambulatory sec-
tor. There are different explanations for a complementary
relationship.
1. A low density of specialists in the ambulatory care
could increase the number of patients an individual
doctor has to treat in a given period of time and
consequently less diseases can be diagnosed due to
less thorough examinations. Conversely, a high
density of specialists allows the individual physician
to spend more time with each patient. In this case
more diseases could be diagnosed, which might lead
to more hospital admissions.
2. Given a fixed treatment time per patient, a low
physician density in a region would lead to less
ambulatory cases or patients per office-based
physician and thus to fewer hospital admissions than
in an area with a higher physician density.
3. A high density of specialists in the ambulatory sector
indicates high competition between the physicians.
In this case the physician would rather refer the
patient to a hospital than to another office-based
doctor, as otherwise there would be the risk of the
patient not returning to the referring physician. This
argument also holds for GPs.
However, these attempted explanations show that the
relationship may depend on the direction of the influ-
ence observed. This implies that in the present analysis
the terms complements and substitutes are not used in
accordance with their strict definitions used in microeco-
nomic theory. There, two production factors can either
be substitutes or complements but not both simultane-
ously. Deviating from this classical definition, here by
complementary is meant that an increase in the num-
ber of cases in one sector results in an increased num-
ber of cases in the other, while substitutivity means that
a reduced number of cases is the consequence. Rather
than identifying the channels through which ambulatory
and hospital cases influence each other, our contribution
consists of illustrating the heterogeneity in the interde-
pendence between the sectors over the various medical
disciplines. This study is to be seen as a basis for fur-
ther research, which needs to take the found linkages
into account to organize a well-functioning cross-sector
needs-based planning.
To explain the relationship between ambulatory
and hospital case numbers, the following system of
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equations is formulated and estimated for each speciality
separately:
HCij = α1Xi + β1HBDij + γ1ACij + δ1GPCi + ε1ij (1)
ACij = α2Xi + β2PDij + γ2HCij + δ2GPCi + ε2ij (2)
GPCi = α3Xi + β3GPDi + γ3HCij + δ3ACij + ε3ij (3)
where HCij denominates the number of hospital cases in
speciality j per 100.000 inhabitants in county i4 , ACij
the number of ambulatory cases in speciality j per 1.000
inhabitants in county i, GPCi the number of GP cases per
1.000 inhabitants in county i and the Xi vector of control
variables which contain, among other things, the average
state of health in the county i. HBDij is the hospital bed
density (beds per 100,000 inhabitants) in speciality j, PDij
the physician density in speciality j and GPDi is the GP
density per 1,000 inhabitants in county i.
The equation system (1) to (3) thus allows ambulatory
and hospital specialist utilization to be mutually inter-
dependent. The GP care can be seen as both preceding
and subsequent area. Thus the case numbers of GP care
can also be influenced by specialist care. The particular
aim of the analysis is the estimation of the coefficients
γ1 and γ2, which model the nature of the interaction
between hospital and ambulatory care, whereby positive
values indicate a complementary and negative values a
substitutive relationship.
We estimate the Eqs. (1) to (3) together with a three-
stage least squares estimator (3SLS). For this the endoge-
nous regressors HCij, ACij and GPCi in the equation
system (1) to (3) are instrumented. Specifically they are
explained by all exogenous variables in the equation sys-
tem and the fitted values are used as regressors in the
second stage. The correlations between the error terms of
the three equations are then estimated from the residuals
of this regression and used in the third stage of the esti-
mation to increase the precision of the estimation results
by a generalized least square estimation.
Variables measuring the supply and exclusion restrictions
The utilization of services is closely linked to the supply
in each of the sectors. A lack of availability in one sec-
tor could, in different regions, cause more services to be
performed by specialists in the other. The analysis must
therefore also consider the regional supply of hospital
beds and office-based doctors.
In order to identify the model, we use exclusion restric-
tions. For instance the physician density (PDij) directly
affects the specialist cases (ACij) but is excluded from
Eq. (1). Thus, we assume that the physician density does
not have an own effect on hospital cases once the sup-
ply of hospital beds and the specialist and GP cases are
controlled for. Note that this does not rule out that physi-
cian density indirectly affects hospital cases via specialist
case. The same holds for the GP density (GPDi).
Vice versa, hospital bed density (HBDij) and GP density
GPDi are assumed not to have an own effect on specialist
cases once specialist physician density as well as hospital
and GP cases are controlled for. Thus, they are excluded
from Eq. (2). Using similar arguments, we exclude HBDij
and PDij from Eq. (3).
When utilizing medical services patients do not respect
county borders. In order to model the regional supply
of ambulatory treatment facilities actually available to
patients more accurately, we therefore define the catch-
ment area for each county as including not only that
county itself but also all surrounding counties whose cen-
tral point is no more than a 30-minute drive from the
central point of the first county. By doing so, we obtain the
physician density for a regional area which is of greater
relevance for utilization patterns than the “county” as
a purely administrative unit. The bed density (beds per
100,000 inhabitants) as a measure of the regional supply of
hospital treatment facilities is determined for a geograph-
ical area which can be covered by car within 60 minutes.
This takes account of the fact that patients are willing
to cover longer distances to reach hospitals than to con-
sult office-based doctors. The underlying data for this are
provided by the Directory of Hospitals and Prevention or
Rehabilitation Facilities [22].
Results
Table 4 offers an overview of the average supply in the two
sectors. Here, the previously mentioned, striking hetero-
geneity in the services available in the two sectors can be
observed as well.
Table 5 show the results of the three-stage least square
estimation for each speciality. Each of the ten columns
refers to a regression with a different speciality. Besides
the three regressors of prime interest to us, all control
variables mentioned above were included in the regres-
sion and are to be found in the Appendix.
Where hospitalizations serve as a dependent variable
(Eq. 1), we obtain for paediatrics and dermatology a
substitutive while for the other specialities there is no
significant connection. Examining the estimated effect
of GP cases on the number of hospital cases reveals a
significant complementary relationship for surgery and
orthopaedics. While for no other specialty a significant
connection is apparent, the sign of the estimated coeffi-
cients points in the same direction, with the exceptions
of ophthalmology, ENT, neurology and dermatology. Yet
for the latter three, the coefficient is almost zero. Dis-
regarding statistical significance, for the majority of spe-
cialties the pattern points to extensive utilization of GP’s
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics: supply of ambulatory and hospital services
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Supply of hospital services per 100.000
inhabitants within a radius of 60 minutes
Bed density in ophthalmology 6,571 2,593 0,000 13,544
Bed density in internal medicine 192,611 30,886 97,041 306,750
Bed density in paediatrics 24,496 6,676 6,465 56,350
Bed density in surgery 133,667 19,133 72,922 253,616
Bed density in urology 18,935 4,079 1,640 32,310
Bed density in orthopaedics 30,399 11,081 0,000 105,177
Bed density in gynaecology 45,311 6,114 26,798 62,291
Bed density in ENT 14,799 4,596 0,000 37,291
Bed density in neurology 26,648 8,763 0,000 82,163
Bed density in dermatology 6,332 3,987 0,000 24,234
Supply of ambulatory services per 1.000
inhabitants within a radius of 30 minutes
Physician density for GPs 0,655 0,065 0,481 1,070
Physician density in ophthalmology 0,064 0,015 0,024 0,174
Physician density in internal medicine 0,108 0,039 0,015 0,323
Physician density in paediatrics 0,074 0,020 0,039 0,250
Physician density in surgery 0,056 0,020 0,015 0,199
Physician density in urology 0,033 0,008 0,013 0,076
Physician density in orthopaedics 0,064 0,018 0,018 0,149
Physician density in gynaecology 0,121 0,027 0,053 0,299
Physician density in ENT 0,047 0,013 0,015 0,134
Physician density in neurology 0,056 0,020 0,008 0,135
Physician density in dermatology 0,041 0,013 0,005 0,091
Observations 1.238
Source: KHV, BAR (Federal Medical Register)
services increases the number of hospitalizations. One
possible explanation is that more GP visits generate more
opportunities for diagnosing diseases leading to hospi-
tal admissions. However, whether this interpretation is
indeed correct could only be verified with the help of indi-
vidual level data. The bed density and therefore the supply
of hospital services has a positive influence on the hospital
case numbers for all specialities. The service event in hos-
pital care is therefore determined to a substantial degree
on the supply side.
The results of the estimation of the equation with the
ambulatory case numbers as a dependent variable (Eq. 2)
indicate a significantly complementary relationship for
orthopaedics, gynaecology and ENT. It is interesting
that for some specialties more hospital cases lead to
more ambulatory cases in these specialities whereas -
looked at the other way around - more ambulatory
cases lead to fewer hospital cases. There is therefore
no clear interdependence between ambulatory and hos-
pital cases here. This could be due to the fact that
there are services in these specialities which are not
feasible on an ambulatory basis and must therefore
be performed in a hospital. Viewed the other way
around, however, a hospital stay requires follow-up treat-
ment in the ambulatory area and therefore manifests a
complementary relationship. It should be noted, how-
ever, that most of the coefficients are not statistically
significant.
Furthermore, all specialities are seen to have a substitu-
tive relationship with the GP cases. Unlike specialist care
in the hospital sector, more GP consultations do not lead
to more cases for office-based specialists. Comprehensive
GP care seems to obviate treatment by office-based spe-
cialists in many cases across all specialities. This result
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Table 5 Regression results for Eqs. (1), (2) and (3)
Ophthalmology Internal medicine Paediatrics Surgery Urology
Hospitalizations (1)
Specialist 0,251 -0,746 -0,751* -0,918 1,660
Ambulatory Cases (0,30) (0,81) (0,33) (1,47) (1,66)
GP Cases −0,151 0,082 0,160 1,966*** 0,200
(0,10) (0,53) (0,13) (0,52) (0,29)
Bed Density 8,972*** 14,882*** 6,794*** 12,009*** 10,503***
(1,78) (1,08) (1,09) (1,26) (1,61)
Specialist Ambulatory Cases (2)
Specialist −0,349 -0,041** 0,134 -0,024 0,043
Hospitalizations (0,22) (0,01) (0,10) (0,01) (0,05)
GP Cases −0,301** −0,419*** −0,257*** −0,251*** −0,158***
(0,09) (0,11) (0,05) (0,06) (0,03)
Specialist 1034,214** 1193,020*** 1150,209*** 1062,275*** 353,974
Physician Density (318,21) (204,96) (205,80) (207,65) (275,68)
GP Cases (3)
Specialist −0,576 −0,031 0,128 −0,047 0,199
Hospitalizations (0,40) (0,02) (0,25) (0,04) (0,27)
Specialist −1,139* 0,152 −1,427*** −0,045 −3,958*
Ambulatory cases (0,55) (0,24) (0,34) (0,54) (1,61)
GP 587,778*** 833,681*** 621,521*** 852,000*** 340,511
Physician Density (153,70) (123,07) (131,93) (150,49) (232,39)
Orthopaedics Gynaecology ENT Neurology Dermatology
Hospitalizations (1)
Specialist −0,291 −0,107 0,834 −2,529 −0,189*
Ambulatory Cases (0,27) (0,49) (0,49) (1,66) (0,09)
GP Cases 0,185* 0,271 −0,023 −0,062 −0,063
(0,09) (0,20) (0,12) (0,22) (0,04)
Bed Density 4,538*** 10,526*** 6,823*** 4,529*** 1,877***
(0,53) (2,27) (1,52) (0,98) (0,40)
Specialist Ambulatory Cases (2)
Specialist 0,174* 0,320** 0,255*** 0,083 −0,200
Hospitalizations (0,07) (0,12) (0,06) (0,07) (0,56)
GP Cases −0,200*** −0,353** −0,137*** −0,124*** −0,306***
(0,05) (0,13) (0,03) (0,03) (0,06)
Specialist 1097,432*** 768,731* 557,960** 236,741* 1214,036***
Physician Density (193,76) (314,89) (204,31) (106,28) (339,65)
GP Cases (3)
Specialist 0,297 0,178 1,259** 0,569 −0,797
Hospitalizations (0,21) (0,23) (0,45) (0,33) (1,31)
Specialist −1,616*** −0,874* −3,759*** −4,453*** −1,339**
Ambulatory Cases (0,39) (0,42) (1,00) (1,30) (0,41)
GP 727,780*** 646,518*** 530,148** 451,625* 556,333***
Physician Density (151,53) (170,14) (179,20) (181,75) (154,93)
Standard error in parentheses, * p<0,10,**p<0,05,***p<0,01
Note: All above mentioned variables were controlled for. Full results can be found in the Appendix
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clearly argues against the hypothesis of initial GP visits
often resulting in treatment cascades involving numerous
subsequent specialist visits. For all specialities except for
urology the physician density has a significantly positive
influence on the case numbers. The supply side thus also
plays an important role for the service event in ambulatory
care.
The results of Eq. 3, where GP cases function as a
dependent variable, we found a complementary rela-
tionship to ENT hospitalizations. This might be due
to follow-up treatment that must not necessarily per-
formed by a specialist, such as wound care. In accor-
dance with this result, we find a qualitatively equivalent
pattern of results concerning the link between ENT spe-
cialist ambulatory cases and GP cases (Eq. 2). Except for
internal medicine and surgery, we also observe a sub-
stitutive connection for all specialties, which indicates a
competitive relationship between GPs and office-based
specialists.
With the help of F tests we examine whether the relevant
instruments contribute significantly to the explanation of
the instrumented variables. Table 6 shows that the instru-
ments for all specialities have a significant explanatory
power with regard to the variation in the specialist cases
and all F tests are clearly over the critical rule-of-thumb
limit of 10. This implies that the estimation results of the
three-stage least square estimation are not the product of
weak instruments and make an interpretation possible.
All in all the results clearly suggest that, within the sec-
tor of ambulatory care, a substitutive relationship exists
beween GPs and specialists visits. Our results are less
clear with respect to the interaction of ambulatory and
inpatient care. For several specialities no significant direct
link in the number of cases is found in the data. Moreover,
the few statistically significant effects are heterogeneous
in their directions. All in all the results of this study
highlight the importance of a disaggregation of the data
for the individual medical specialities, as they reveal a
clear heterogeneity in the interdependences between the
sectors.
Discussion
In Germany specialist care can be provided by both
the ambulatory and the hospital sectors. The purpose
of this study has been to examine the interdependen-
cies between the two sectors. In doing so, we have taken
account of the potential problem that the number of
the specialist cases could be endogenous. That is to
say, a complementary connection cannot be immediately
inferred from a positive correlation, because in certain
regions both ambulatory and hospital services could occur
with particular frequency or infrequency due to unob-
served factors, such as unobserved morbidity differences.
Another problem with the potential to cause mislead-
ing interpretations of the correlation is that more hos-
pital cases might also lead directly to more ambulatory
cases.
The connections have been investigated by means of a
simultaneous system of equations which not only controls
for the regional differences in state of health and other
structures but also takes into account the interdepen-
dent relationship between hospital and ambulatory cases.
A strength of the study lies in its analysis of the treat-
ments according tomedical specialities, a proceduremade
possible by comprehensive administrative data sources.
This differentiation by individual specialities clearly iden-
tifies relationships which would not be recognisable with
less specific data, i.e. if ambulatory and hospital services
were each treated as homogeneous goods. The hetero-
geneous basis of the analysis crystallises out the specific
differences between the medical disciplines. It makes little
sense to cast ophthalmological and gynaecological ser-
vices together “into the same pot” since they are neither
comparable nor mutually interchangeable. Finally, policy
recommendations will also vary according to the special-
ity in question.
Table 6 F-Test of the instruments
Ophthalmology Internal medicine Paediatrics Surgery Urology
Bed density for F (1,1219) = 52,77 F (1,1219) = 168,14 F (1,1219) = 16,67 F (1,1219) = 130,49 F (1,1219) = 77,68
Specialists (radius 60) Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000
Physician density for F (1,1219) = 16,16 F (1,1219) = 35,30 F (1,1219) = 94,27 F (1,1219) = 50,94 F (1,1219) = 7,05
Specialists (radius 30) Prob > F = 0,0001 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0080
Physician density for F (1,1219) = 35,95 F (1,1219) = 47,74 F (1,1219) = 35,57 F (1,1219) = 51,39 F (1,1219) = 47,13
GPs (radius 30) Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000
Orthopaedics Gynaecology ENT Neurology Dermatology
Bed density for F (1,1219) = 46,91 F (1,1219) = 42,29 F (1,1219) =78,34 F (1,1219) = 42,12 F (1,1219) = 13,44
Specialists (radius 60) Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0001 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0003
Physician density for F (1,1219) = 78,28 F (1,1219) = 17,77 F (1,1219) = 64,05 F (1,1219) = 31,44 F (1,1219) = 51,03
Specialists (radius 30) Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000
Physician density for F (1,1219) = 31,51 F (1,1219) = 35,43 F (1,1219) = 47,25 F (1,1219) = 41,63 F (1,1219) = 42,36
GPs (radius 30) Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000 Prob > F = 0,0000
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The results show a substitutive relationship for pae-
diatrics and dermatology with more ambulatory cases
leading to fewer hospital cases. If the perspective is
reversed, however, and the focus is on how additional
hospital cases influence case numbers in the ambulatory
sector, a complementary relationship can be observed
for orthopaedics, gynaecology and otorhinolaryngology
(ENT). It is interesting that for some specialties more
hospital cases lead to more/fewer ambulatory cases in
these specialities whereas - looked at the other way
around - more ambulatory cases lead to fewer/more hos-
pital cases. Thus in this speciality there can be talk of
neither a clearly substitutive nor an unambiguously com-
plementary relationship. However, this interpretation
mainly grounds in the point estimates as many of the
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.
The role played by general practice in all this is inter-
esting. While GP consultations displace the services of
ambulatory specialists across all disciplines, for hospital
care the picture is different. Even it is just significant for
surgery and orthopaedics the results indicate that addi-
tional cases for GPs seem to entail more hospital admis-
sions for some specialities. Thus increasing the supply of
GPs may well eliminate potentially superfluous specialist
consultations, albeit at the price of raising the number of
particularly cost-intensive hospitalizations. This might be
due our theoretical argument of a substitutive relation-
ship. The higher the competition between the physicians
or the risk that a patient does not return to the referring
physician the higher is the incentive to refer directly to the
hospital.
On the other hand additional ambulatory cases in the
specialities go along with smaller numbers of GP cases
except for internal medicine.
The question as to whether ambulatory and hospital ser-
vices complement or substitute each other depends, on
the one hand, on the medical speciality and, on the other,
on the direction of influence. Depending on the treatment
needed, some patients can already be cared for entirely on
an ambulatory basis or at least receive sufficient treatment
from office-based doctors to avoid hospitalization. On the
other hand, a hospital stay can necessitate intensive after-
care treatment which is then provided by office-based
doctors. Accordingly, the interdependence of ambulatory
and hospital cases can vary in its intensity and even
direction.
Our paper has several limitations which are grounded
in the availability of data and should be taken into account
when implications are considered. Given that our data are
aggregated on the county level, we cannot clearly say, in
case of a complementary relationship, whether patients
first see a GP or ambulatory specialist and then enter a
hospital or whether it is the other way around. Moreover,
a complementary relationship per se is not informative
about efficient or inefficient use of resources in the sys-
tem. Positive relationships might either indicate that both
sectors work well together, or hint at unnecessary dupli-
cations of services – and vice versa for substitutive rela-
tionships. Outcome data might be a way to evaluate this
which, however, are not available in the present study.
Nevertheless, this exploratory study has its value in
being a first starting point in a not well understood
research area, and should be seen as a basis for digging
deeper into the question of which deficits in the interplay
of both sectors exist and how to improve the efficiency
of health care provision in Germany. Heterogeneity in the
interdependencies can also be identified on the aggregate
level and the main policy implication is that this should be
taken into account in cross-sector needs-based planning.
This means, for example, that any reduction in capacity
deemed necessary in the hospital sector should not be car-
ried out indiscriminately across all medical specialities.
Such cuts are better suited to departments whose services
can be absorbed by the ambulatory sector than to those
where they cannot.
Conclusions
Again, while this study cannot make a statement on the
current state of efficiency in the interplay between both
sectors, it should be the starting point for further anal-
ysis, which focusses on implementing a well-functioning
cross-sector needs-based planning regime. Especially for
analysis of the committees, which were formed in indi-
vidual states in 2012, to submit recommendations on
cross-sector healthcare issues.
Endnotes
1 Just over 10% of the German population are privately
insured.
2This database contains a total of some 500 indica-
tors, based almost exclusively on official statistics, on
topics such as population and social structure, the econ-
omy and employment, income and education, aggregated
according to administrative areas (states, counties, local
government districts). A precise description can be found
at www.bbsr.bund.de.
3PM10 (Particulate Matter 10) is a commonly-used
standard specifying the aerodynamic diameter from
which particles count as particulate matter. In the case of
PM10 particles with a size of up to 15 microns go into a
weighting function, in which at a size of approx. 10micron
half the particles go in.
4Here and in the following “inhabitants” always means
“statutorily insured inhabitants”. The term has been
abbreviated for the sake of simplicity.
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Appendix
Table 7 Utilization of services (supplement to Table 1)
Mean Min Max Min Max Min Max
2007 2008 2009 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009
Hospital cases per
100.000 SHI population
Ophthalmology 412 415 413 175 1118 164 1064 126 1023
Internal Medicine 8.720 8.952 9.084 5.564 14.233 2.967 14.973 5.409 15.335
Paediatrics 1.471 1.481 1.474 1.073 2.632 838 2.727 990 2.678
Surgery 5.804 5.962 6.062 4.049 10.054 3.088 10.703 3.932 10.856
Urology 910 931 938 601 1.532 371 1.535 464 1.677
Orthopaedics 947 985 1.006 495 1.713 536 1.798 600 1.763
Gynaecology 2.970 2.953 2.869 1.786 5.804 1.528 5.114 1.444 5.428
ENT 817 826 825 417 1.326 488 1.250 491 1.252
Neurology 1.016 1.045 1.092 558 2.055 397 2.169 614 2.082
Radiology 200 197 192 72 431 52 457 69 406
Dermatology 256 268 274 161 503 164 491 168 468
Ambulatory cases per
1.000 SHI population
General Practice 2.427 2.677 3.020 482 3.786 577 3.972 2.023 4.505
Ophthalmology 368 414 444 53 587 107 700 104 1.433
Internal Medicine 312 375 462 109 693 113 762 36 1.770
Paediatrics 303 461 355 28 480 65 722 59 961
Surgery 167 195 211 39 410 65 431 30 737
Urology 133 151 177 10 301 55 359 0 657
Orthopaedics 274 321 351 41 729 73 561 0 1.637
Gynaecology 564 647 693 149 859 152 967 100 3.551
ENT 214 240 257 14 417 73 461 0 722
Neurology 160 182 202 33 407 76 406 0 863
Radiology 148 233 288 9 509 93 544 0 1.879
Dermatology 245 278 295 65 546 81 457 0 1.544
N 413 413 412
Source: DRG statistics, KBV
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Table 8 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (1)
Specialist hospitalizations Ophthalmology Internal medicine Paediatrics Surgery Urology
Specialist 0,251 −0,746 −0,751* −0,918 1,660
Ambulatory Cases (0,30) (0,81) (0,33) (1,47) (1,66)
GP Cases −0,151 0,082 0,160 1,966*** 0,200
(0,30) (0,81) (0,33) (1,47) (1,66)
Bed Density 8,972*** 14,882*** 6,794*** 12,009*** 10,503***
(1,78) (1,08) (1,09) (1,26) (1,61)
Male −13,322 −251,611*** −49,505*** −55,089 16,414
Life Expectancy (8,78) (55,48) (9,92) (51,37) (23,11)
Female −13,904* −252,349*** −7,400 −60,530 −26,399**
Life Expectancy (6,87) (47,11) (10,23) (37,80) (8,51)
RSA Risk Factor 790,668*** 9416,139*** 59,333 235,517 16,951
(239,02) (1217,78) (234,30) (1032,70) (719,47)
Long−Term Care Recipients −0,342*** 3,882*** 0,146 1,446* 0,389**
per 10.000 Population (0,10) (0,73) (0,14) (0,58) (0,13)
Unemployment Rate in % −1,748 −57,284* −4,133 −10,953 1,093
(3,57) (23,05) (4,96) (18,52) (5,22)
Net Monthly −0,026 −0,104 −0,133** 0,256 0,070
Household Income (0,03) (0,23) (0,05) (0,20) (0,09)
Number of Large 26,504** −42,441 10,944 −178,167*** −4,221
Regional Centres (9,99) (72,12) (15,06) (53,27) (22,99)
Number of Medium 6,955*** 56,546*** 6,645** 21,394* 7,299***
Regional Centres (1,55) (11,04) (2,08) (8,94) (2,00)
Highly Qualified 5,269* 2,472 13,874*** 0,411 −0,910
Workers in % (2,31) (15,94) (2,65) (11,04) (4,60)
Low−Skilled −2,810 11,982 0,056 0,250 −1,716
Workers in % (1,52) (10,86) (2,08) (8,55) (1,83)
Single−Person 1,040 −36,929*** −9,376*** −1,579 −5,070*
Households in % (2,07) (10,63) (1,66) (5,67) (2,57)
Immigrants in % −0,933 67,813*** 10,472*** 31,241*** 5,143
(2,45) (11,09) (1,83) (8,60) (5,34)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −0,575 1,047 −3,085* −2,290 0,724
(0,93) (6,42) (1,26) (4,08) (1,20)
Year 2007 −97,177 −341,588 41,458 971,194** 158,788
(65,13) (343,76) (84,38) (344,37) (234,79)
Year 2008 −62,836* −78,042 126,807*** 642,815*** 94,521
(30,63) (191,63) (30,33) (184,00) (126,57)
Constants 2210,626** 36963,049*** 5895,104*** 6794,790 657,202
(728,98) (5216,84) (840,37) (4629,84) (1990,99)
N 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
Specialist −0,291 −0,107 0,834 −2,529 −0,189*
Ambulatory Cases (0,27) (0,49) (0,49) (1,66) (0,09)
GP Cases 0,185* 0,271 −0,023 −0,062 −0,063
(0,09) (0,20) (0,12) (0,22) (0,04)
Bed Density 4,538*** 10,526*** 6,823*** 4,529*** 1,877***
(0,53) (2,27) (1,52) (0,98) (0,40)
Male −33,468*** 28,139 −23,392* −38,480* −13,574***
Life Expectancy (7,99) (16,89) (11,13) (16,05) (2,93)
Female −17,195* −1,670 4,022 −49,471*** 0,148
Life Expectancy (7,42) (14,56) (6,38) (10,52) (2,39)
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Table 8 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (1) Continued
Specialist hospitalizations Orthopaedics Gynaecology ENT Neurology Dermatology
RSA Risk Factor 266,322 −1927,010*** 28,083 1737,440* 420,579***
(186,38) (331,36) (183,55) (696,28) (69,43)
Long−term Care Recipients 0,351** −0,023 0,543*** −0,047 0,067
per 10.000 Population (0,11) (0,25) (0,09) (0,27) (0,04)
Unemployment Rate in % −9,086** 16,902* −3,725 −13,861* −3,579**
(3,02) (7,75) (2,89) (6,14) (1,33)
Net Monthly 0,132*** −0,347*** −0,059* −0,021 0,023*
Household Income (0,03) (0,08) (0,03) (0,07) (0,01)
Number of Large −4,828 −16,837 24,910* 35,340 3,563
Regional Centres (9,79) (21,50) (12,05) (26,27) (4,09)
Number of Medium 10,657*** 1,623 4,543** 5,120* 0,829
Regional Centres (1,77) (3,63) (1,55) (2,46) (0,55)
Highly Qualified 0,213 30,002*** 2,149 1,580 5,730***
Workers in % (2,40) (7,32) (2,08) (3,03) (1,03)
Low−skilled −4,231* 12,114*** 2,948* 4,016 −3,712***
Workers in % (1,67) (3,35) (1,50) (3,68) (0,56)
Single−Person −0,587 4,102 −8,417*** 6,293 −0,410
Households in % (1,87) (7,25) (2,23) (7,25) (0,64)
Immigrants in % 5,108*** 12,239*** 0,695 6,908*** 1,481*
(1,54) (3,50) (1,61) (2,08) (0,67)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −0,664 −2,693 0,430 −4,217 −0,917*
(0,83) (2,21) (0,68) (2,59) (0,37)
Year 2007 64,083 200,153 2,554 −170,225 −56,515*
(61,50) (142,10) (84,09) (184,27) (25,84)
Year 2008 65,479* 143,838* −4,045 −64,197 −22,976
(30,37) (65,05) (41,37) (86,16) (12,86)
Constants 3928,720*** 1463,968 2220,432* 6785,421*** 1139,500***
(716,27) (1615,06) (980,77) (1693,01) (316,57)
N 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
Standard error in parentheses, * p<0,10,**p<0,05,***p<0,01
Note: All above mentioned variables were controlled for. Full results can be found in the Appendix
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Table 9 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (2)
Specialists ambulatory cases Ophthalmology Internal medicine Paediatrics Surgery Urology
Specialist Hospitalizations −0,349 −0,041** 0,134 −0,024 0,043
(0,22) (0,01) (0,10) (0,01) (0,05)
GP Cases −0,301** −0,419*** −0,257*** −0,251*** −0,158***
(0,09) (0,11) (0,05) (0,06) (0,03)
Specialist 1034,214** 1193,020*** 1150,209*** 1062,275*** 353,974
Physician Density (318,21) (204,96) (205,80) (207,65) (275,68)
Male −27,529** −56,462*** −6,735 −29,130*** −12,677***
Life Expectancy (8,62) (12,14) (7,12) (5,48) (3,33)
Female 1,893 −11,697 13,939** 3,563 3,268
Life Expectancy (7,42) (9,98) (5,31) (4,89) (3,42)
RSA Risk Factor 963,151** 1374,248*** 342,856** 499,031*** 384,871***
(293,05) (292,08) (105,36) (108,87) (85,45)
Long−Term Care Recipients −0,185 0,102 −0,014 0,134 −0,054
per 10.000 Population (0,14) (0,15) (0,08) (0,07) (0,05)
Unemployment Rate in % −10,135** −23,250*** −9,766*** −9,558*** −2,354
(3,11) (4,25) (1,97) (2,13) (1,29)
Net Monthly −0,057 −0,162*** −0,071** −0,073** −0,048***
Household Income (0,03) (0,04) (0,02) (0,02) (0,01)
Number of Large 30,030* 53,129*** 25,673*** 14,811* 11,818**
Regional Centres (12,01) (12,92) (6,70) (6,72) (4,31)
Number of Medium 1,734 3,204 0,044 1,700 0,177
Regional Centres (2,15) (2,50) (1,35) (1,19) (0,90)
Highly Qualified 6,752** 10,888*** −0,687 2,167 2,318*
Workers in % (2,47) (2,76) (2,11) (1,37) (0,96)
Low−Skilled 0,025 −1,163 2,103 −0,495 0,455
Workers in % (1,77) (2,22) (1,23) (1,11) (0,74)
Single−Person 5,869*** 4,935** 3,231* −0,274 1,283*
Households in % (1,23) (1,72) (1,46) (0,75) (0,57)
Immigrants in % −7,687*** −4,667* 0,080 −2,726* −3,074***
(1,61) (2,24) (1,37) (1,17) (0,68)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −2,660*** −5,063*** −2,331*** −1,068* −0,554
(0,77) (1,00) (0,56) (0,50) (0,33)
Year 2007 −218,644*** −307,591*** −162,635*** −158,596*** −131,132***
(58,23) (65,29) (31,99) (32,08) (20,08)
Year 2008 −90,597** −128,691*** 54,803** −62,213*** −70,303***
(33,17) (36,82) (19,07) (18,68) (11,68)
Constants 2473,987** 6143,137*** −61,622 2672,262*** 988,383**
(932,71) (1190,85) (750,33) (526,49) (349,18)
N 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238
Specialist Hospitalizations 0,174* 0,320** 0,255*** 0,083 −0,200
(0,07) (0,12) (0,06) (0,07) (0,56)
GP Cases −0,200*** −0,353** −0,137*** −0,124*** −0,306***
(0,05) (0,13) (0,03) (0,03) (0,06)
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Table 9 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (2) Continued
Specialists Orthopaedics Gynaecology ENT Neurology Dermatology
ambulatory cases
Specialist 1097,432*** 768,731* 557,960** 236,741* 1214,036***
Physician Density (193,76) (314,89) (204,31) (106,28) (339,65)
Male −8,219 −27,768* −8,234* −5,971 −20,240*
Life Expectancy (5,49) (12,56) (4,02) (3,29) (9,27)
Female 7,037 3,935 0,829 1,152 −3,750
Life Expectancy (5,41) (12,45) (3,48) (4,29) (6,49)
RSA Risk Factor 314,001** 812,547** 176,453* 309,764*** 515,128*
(104,84) (296,34) (70,24) (84,15) (248,76)
Long−Term Care Recipients −0,130 0,231 −0,150* −0,165** −0,033
per 10.000 Population (0,08) (0,19) (0,06) (0,05) (0,10)
Unemployment Rate in % −1,822 −16,971*** −1,541 −1,981 −9,565***
(2,01) (5,07) (1,29) (1,21) (2,87)
Net Monthly −0,037 0,016 0,004 −0,039** −0,032
Household Income (0,02) (0,07) (0,02) (0,01) (0,03)
Number of Large 9,840 29,436 8,303 13,189** 28,567***
Regional Centres (6,82) (16,41) (4,79) (4,05) (8,38)
Number of Medium −3,122* 2,186 −0,112 −0,717 0,237
Regional Centres (1,43) (2,97) (0,88) (0,87) (1,55)
Highly Qualified 4,029** 2,648 1,101 0,760 8,692**
Workers in % (1,49) (5,40) (1,02) (0,92) (3,21)
Low−Skilled 2,121 −3,070 0,381 1,883* −1,545
Workers in % (1,23) (2,99) (0,82) (0,73) (2,61)
Single−Person 4,448*** 11,395*** 4,792*** 4,060*** 4,092**
Households in % (0,86) (2,03) (0,71) (0,61) (1,26)
Immigrants in % −2,260 −8,041* −1,560* −0,813 −4,108*
(1,18) (3,25) (0,72) (0,78) (1,79)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −1,374* −2,727 −0,584 −1,413*** −2,948***
(0,54) (1,39) (0,36) (0,34) (0,70)
Year 2007 −160,511*** −284,296*** −107,172*** −101,125*** −210,424***
(30,80) (75,82) (19,82) (17,88) (40,46)
Year 2008 −65,327*** −113,216* −46,860*** −45,597*** −91,659***
(18,76) (44,71) (11,71) (10,69) (22,99)
Constants 374,894 1473,006 697,276 492,033 2609,837***
(538,55) (1294,81) (376,95) (402,82) (745,61)
N 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238
Standard error in parentheses, * p<0,10,**p<0,05,***p<0,01
Note: All above mentioned variables were controlled for. Full results can be found in the Appendix
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Table 10 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (3)
GP cases Ophthalmology Internal medicine Paediatrics Surgery Urology
Specialist Hospitalizations −0,576 −0,031 0,128 −0,047 0,199
(0,40) (0,02) (0,25) (0,04) (0,27)
Specialist −1,139* 0,152 −1,427*** −0,045 −3,958*
Ambulatory Cases (0,55) (0,24) (0,34) (0,54) (1,61)
GP 587,778*** 833,681*** 621,521*** 852,000*** 340,511
Physician Density (153,70) (123,07) (131,93) (150,49) (232,39)
Male −73,708*** −75,607*** −51,278* −76,703*** −74,444***
Life Expectancy (12,65) (13,71) (20,17) (15,01) (13,93)
Female 7,028 4,682 28,698* 8,096 17,241
Life Expectancy (16,70) (13,98) (14,45) (13,36) (18,18)
RSA Risk Factor 2124,649*** 1673,021*** 1371,695*** 1510,455*** 1989,814***
(383,09) (349,39) (227,19) (259,30) (400,82)
Long−Term Care Recipients −0,163 0,317 0,054 0,290 −0,130
per 10.000 Population (0,29) (0,20) (0,21) (0,21) (0,29)
Unemployment Rate in % −26,618*** −24,958*** −27,944*** −28,589*** −18,148***
(3,99) (4,57) (3,63) (4,31) (5,14)
Net Monthly −0,158* −0,138* −0,213** −0,158** −0,247**
Household Income (0,06) (0,06) (0,07) (0,06) (0,08)
Number of Large 76,274*** 56,228*** 76,514*** 61,814*** 68,596***
Regional Centres (18,36) (16,54) (16,51) (15,05) (19,08)
Number of Medium 2,888 2,880 0,486 1,623 0,741
Regional Centres (4,46) (3,47) (3,70) (3,49) (4,71)
Highly Qualified 12,158* 4,342 4,580 5,831 10,937*
Workers in % (4,97) (4,31) (5,76) (3,82) (5,30)
Low−Skilled −4,294 −6,206* −1,475 −6,552* −0,330
Workers in % (3,76) (2,88) (3,31) (3,04) (4,39)
Single−Person 4,429 −9,315** 1,041 −6,593** 3,622
Households in % (4,43) (3,25) (4,04) (2,37) (4,93)
Immigrants in % −15,685*** −7,856** −6,661* −10,046*** −15,960***
(3,58) (2,68) (3,30) (2,44) (3,63)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −2,988 0,739 −3,422 −0,179 −2,067
(1,95) (1,81) (1,80) (1,48) (1,92)
Year 2007 −637,721*** −576,277*** −628,767*** −586,597*** −739,949***
(31,80) (32,89) (27,37) (29,41) (68,96)
Year 2008 −316,683*** −312,976*** −148,151*** −312,622*** −399,917***
(23,21) (21,37) (42,11) (20,07) (42,43)
Constants 6808,650*** 7204,256*** 3720,273 7229,778*** 6118,658***
(1247,22) (1465,95) (2109,81) (1447,05) (1458,26)
N 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238
Specialist Hospitalizations 0,297 0,178 1,259** 0,569 −0,797
(0,21) (0,23) (0,45) (0,33) (1,31)
Specialist −1,616*** −0,874* −3,759*** −4,453*** −1,339**
Ambulatory Cases (0,39) (0,42) (1,00) (1,30) (0,41)
GP 727,780*** 646,518*** 530,148** 451,625* 556,333***
Physician Density (151,53) (170,14) (179,20) (181,75) (154,93)
Male −54,815*** −68,119*** −51,877** −44,313* −69,495***
Life Expectancy (16,44) (13,62) (17,10) (19,47) (18,80)
Female 16,669 10,755 8,224 18,368 2,214
Life Expectancy (15,86) (16,83) (17,78) (23,83) (15,48)
Büyükdurmus et al. Health Economics Review  (2017) 7:2 Page 18 of 19
Table 10 Complete estimation results of the 3SLS: Eq. (3) Continued
GP cases Orthopaedics Gynaecology ENT Neurology Dermatology
RSA Risk Factor 1448,408*** 1501,701*** 1264,721*** 1721,808** 1673,007**
(265,12) (368,27) (264,22) (661,84) (513,41)
Long−Term Care Recipients −0,100 0,321 −0,574 −0,713* 0,090
per 10.000 Population (0,25) (0,27) (0,37) (0,35) (0,25)
Unemployment Rate in % −19,411*** −30,104*** −15,279** −15,843* −27,920***
(5,09) (5,48) (5,19) (6,40) (4,73)
Net Monthly −0,150* −0,122 −0,037 −0,235** −0,119
Household Income (0,07) (0,11) (0,08) (0,08) (0,07)
Number of Large 52,497** 66,471*** 47,696* 79,434*** 70,791***
Regional Centres (17,75) (19,28) (21,61) (23,87) (17,62)
Number of Medium −5,559 2,750 −1,995 −4,924 0,677
Regional Centres (4,37) (4,18) (4,52) (4,76) (3,71)
Highly Qualified 10,878* 9,807 5,665 4,339 17,526*
Workers in % (4,60) (7,39) (5,18) (5,27) (8,30)
Low−Skilled −1,281 −6,163 −2,909 6,216 −7,735
Workers in % (3,80) (4,05) (4,17) (5,23) (5,90)
Single−Person 4,837 6,460 18,482* 18,637** 2,506
Households in % (3,59) (6,70) (7,23) (6,47) (3,88)
Immigrants in % −9,329** −12,246** −11,197*** −8,582* −10,296**
(2,85) (4,32) (3,20) (3,80) (3,95)
Particulate Matter (PM 10) −1,767 −2,564 −1,574 −5,803* −4,060
(1,68) (2,11) (1,91) (2,71) (2,09)
Year 2007 −661,415*** −656,445*** −686,662*** −702,031*** −635,668***
(31,22) (48,38) (38,98) (60,98) (34,01)
Year 2008 −326,545*** −322,895*** −333,583*** −340,861*** −314,415***
(22,87) (27,16) (26,65) (32,32) (22,89)
Constants 4492,968** 5784,788*** 4400,430** 3203,080 7198,978***
(1678,49) (1554,32) (1635,34) (2502,86) (1535,34)
N 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.238
Standard error in parentheses, * p<0,10,**p<0,05,***p<0,01
Note: All above mentioned variables were controlled for. Full results can be found in the Appendix
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